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INTRODUCTION
A hotel guest, intent on squatting, overstays his reservation; what
does the hotel manager do? The answer is relatively simple: he uses
his legal right as an innkeeper to evict the unwelcomed guest. For
Airbnb1 hosts, however, such a right to evict is dubious at best.
Cory Tschogl discovered the hard way how indifferent the law is
to her position as an Airbnb host.2 After listing her San Francisco
condominium on Airbnb to help afford rent, Tschogl accepted a
guest for a forty-four-day stay.3 The guest had no reviews from other
Airbnb hosts, so Tschogl accepted his reservation blindly (much like
a hotelier accepting travelers as they walk in the door or make
reservations online).4 None of this is out of the ordinary for users of
the room-sharing website. But, after the guest refused to pay beyond
the first thirty days, Tschogl learned that who she thought was
simply a guest had actually become her tenant.5 Thus, Tschogl could
not evict the guest without going through the process prescribed in
California’s eviction laws: an expensive, months-long legal fight to
finally remove the Airbnb squatter in her condominium.6 In the
meantime, the squatter threatened to sue Tschogl for blackmail and
medical costs allegedly resulting from unsafe tap water.7 This un-
necessary nightmare could have been avoided had California law
differentiated between Airbnb host-guest relationships and those of
the traditional landlord and tenant.
California is not alone in this view. Current doctrine in several
states treats Airbnb hosts as landlords, particularly when guests
1. Airbnb is an online marketplace that allows ordinary people to rent out their proper-
ties or spare rooms to guests. See About Us, AIRBNB, https://press.atairbnb.com/about-us/
[https://perma.cc/N3L4-6CCC]. For a more descriptive background of the company, see infra
Part I. 
2. See Chris Matyszczyk, Airbnb Guest Stays More than 30 Days, Gets Tenant’s Rights,








stay for a length of time exceeding thirty days,8 and even for guests
staying under thirty days.9 Additionally, many locales have yet to
recognize short-term Airbnb listings as legal, compromising the
ability of hosts to evict guests who should not be considered tenants
even under traditional law.10 The result for Airbnb hosts is a legal
limbo: either they are treated as landlords, subject to burdensome
eviction laws, or they are considered black-market hoteliers, hesi-
tant to use local law enforcement to evict guests because regulators
have outlawed short-term rentals.11 This limbo has created a quasi-
underground marketplace, with unclear legal and regulatory
guidelines—an unacceptable approach to a fast-growing sector of
the modern economy.
Because the sharing economy presents new challenges and op-
portunities that are independent of either traditional hospitality law
or landlord-tenant doctrine, legislatures and state courts should
adopt a uniform regulatory scheme for all Airbnb host-guest rela-
tionships that: (1) provides innkeeper tort liability for hosts; (2)
relieves hosts of eviction procedures; and (3) treats hosts as micro-
hoteliers, not landlords. This Note proposes a model for how the law
should treat Airbnb hosts (as the preeminent example of room-
sharing entrepreneurs), bringing together existing paradigms from
traditional areas of the law to create a new doctrinal treatment
focused on promoting the sharing economy and ensuring proper
regulation of its users.
8. See, e.g., N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-521 (2017) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to
evict or attempt to evict an occupant of a dwelling unit who has lawfully occupied the dwelling
unit for thirty consecutive days or longer.”); What Are Some Things I Should Consider Before
Hosting Long-Term Guests?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb. com/help/article/805/what-are-some-
things-i-should-consider-before-hosting-long-term-guests [https://perma.cc/D26U-Z26W] (“In
most states and localities in the United States, guests who stay in a home or apartment for
approximately 30 days ... may establish rights as a tenant.”); Matyszczyk, supra note 2 (“In
California, if someone rents for 30 days, they are considered on a month-to-month lease.”). 
9. See Talia G. Loucks, Travelers Beware: Tort Liability in the Sharing Economy, 10
WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 329, 334 (2015) (“New York courts have held that hosts in Airbnb
room shares are indeed landlords.”). 
10. Airbnb hosts for short-term guests must decide between revealing their operations to
local authorities that might levy sanctions and using those authorities to remove unruly
guests. For examples of the harsh treatment of Airbnb in some localities, see infra notes 86-89
and accompanying text. 
11. For specific attitudes local regulators have had toward Airbnb, see infra Parts I.A.2-3. 
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This Note will argue that instead of treating Airbnb hosts as
landlords, and their guests as tenants, the law should see the plat-
form as establishing a modern take on the innkeeper role. But even
then, much of hospitality law places too great a burden on Airbnb
hosts, which would threaten to stifle the growth of this new in-
dustry. In the interest of promoting the sharing economy as a new
opportunity for tax and tourism revenues, governments should
instead aim to steer the line between uniformly regulating the
established (that is, brick-and-mortar hotels) and unestablished
(that is, room-sharing services) sectors of the hospitality industry,
on the one hand, and promoting noncommercialized use of room-
sharing platforms, on the other. Applying a modern take on inn-
keeper doctrine would provide tort protections to guests that are
greater than those given to tenants, while giving hosts the ability to
evict unwelcome squatters. The doctrine would compel hosts
providing hospitality services to show greater care for their guests,
but would not require the full medley of regulation imposed on
professional hoteliers. This Note will explore doctrinal options and
propose ways to both regulate room-sharing platforms where the
interest in safety and guest enjoyment so requires, and allow hosts
the freedom to use these platforms as money-making mechanisms,
promoting the overall growth of the sharing economy.
Part I will cover the development of Airbnb as the forerunner of
the room-sharing economy, analyzing both its impact on the hospi-
tality industry, rental markets, and community harmony, and the
potential for meaningful regulation. Part II will juxtapose and
summarize landlord-tenant law and traditional innkeeper doctrine
in the context of Airbnb. Given this setup, Part III will make the
case for why landlord-tenant law misses the mark when it comes to
the room-sharing relationship. Part IV will propose a new treatment
for Airbnb hosts that recognizes them as micro-hoteliers with a duty
to protect guests from known hazards, while affording hosts the
ability to evict destructive squatters at will. Ultimately, this Note
proposes a framework that will help bring uniformity and congru-
ence to an industry currently in regulatory flux.
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I. THE RISE OF AIRBNB AND THE ROOM-SHARING ECONOMY
Although other room-sharing applications and services exist,
Airbnb has undoubtedly experienced the most exponential growth.12
Officially started in 2008, a year after three friends with air mat-
tresses filled a need for more lodging at a design conference in San
Francisco,13 Airbnb has grown to have a larger inventory of rooms
than the largest hotel chains in the world.14 By 2014, the site had
“more lodging than Hilton Worldwide or InterContinental Hotels
Group or any other hotel chain in the world.”15 As of 2017, the site
reported over 3 million listings in more than 191 countries and over
160 million total guest arrivals.16 More impressive than its sheer
size is Airbnb’s rate of growth, with forty-seven thousand guests in
2010 growing to sixteen million in 2015.17 Arguably, one of the
primary catalysts of this growth has been the novelty of many
12. See Johanna Interian, Note, Up in the Air: Harmonizing the Sharing Economy
Through Airbnb Regulations, 39 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 129, 132 (2016) (“Airbnb’s growth
... makes it the irrefutable leader of the home-sharing apps industry.”). Compare About Us,
AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us [https://perma.cc/4UC2-6UZC] (reporting over
three million listings in sixty-five thousand cities as of mid-2017), with About FlipKey,
FLIPKEY, https://www.flipkey.com/pages/about_us/ [https://perma.cc/8F75-M64F] (reporting
three hundred thousand listings in eleven thousand cities), and About HomeAway, Inc.,
HOMEAWAY, https://www.homeaway.com/info/about-us/company-info [https://perma.cc/MMG9-
EZUD] (reporting 1.2 million listings as of mid-2017). For summaries of Airbnb alternatives,
see Best 9 Sites Like Airbnb to Book Your Vacation, TECHBOOMERS, https://techboomers.com/t/
sites-like-airbnb [https://perma.cc/N7D2-X3GJ].
13. See Jessica Salter, Airbnb: The Story Behind the $1.3bn Room-Letting Website, TELE-
GRAPH (Sept. 7, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/9525267/Airbnb-
The-story-behind-the-1.3bn-room-letting-website.html [https://perma.cc/U6FN-2Z3A].
14. Alamea Deedee Bitran, Comment, The Uber Innovations that Lyfted Our Standards
out of Thin Air[bnb], Because Now, “There’s an App for That,” 8 ELON L. REV. 503, 505 (2016).
15. Id. (quoting Burt Helm, Airbnb Is Inc.’s 2014 Company of the Year, INC. (Dec. 2014-
Jan. 2015), http://www.inc.com/magazine/201412/burt-helm/airbnb-company-of-the-year-2014.
html [https://perma.cc/QZB5-SXDE]). 
16. Fast Facts, AIRBNB, https://press.atairbnb.com/fast-facts/ [https://perma.cc/DC9G-
SW4Y]. The company’s single largest night to date was New Year’s Eve 2016, “with nearly 2
million guests staying at listings worldwide.” Id. 
17. See Nathan McAlone, This Chart Shows Exactly How Insane Airbnb’s Growth Has
Been over the Past 5 Years, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 8, 2015, 1:55 PM), http://www.businessinsider.
com/airbnbs-summer-reach-has-grown-by-353-times-in-5-years-2015-9 [https://perma.cc/
GA84-PLLR] (“That means that Airbnb’s summer reach is 353 times what it was five years
ago.”). 
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Airbnb accommodations, including opportunities to stay in castles,
treehouses, and yurts.18
From its tremendous volume of transactions, the company gener-
ates revenue by collecting a flat, 3 percent commission on the money
hosts receive, and by charging an additional reservation fee (be-
tween 6 and 12 percent) to guests.19 In 2015, the company brought
in a reported $900 million in revenue (though it still operated at a
loss of an estimated $150 million).20 That is compared to 2013, when
the company brought in $250 million.21 In 2016, experts valued the
company at up to $30 billion,22 and predicted it would bring in $1.7
billion in revenue.23 These numbers show the continued vitality of
Airbnb—despite regulatory blockades—although the company still
relies on investors to raise critical revenue.24
As such a large, fast-growing company, Airbnb has created
concerns and garnered criticisms as an unregulated threat to hotel
establishments, rental markets, and community harmony.25 But
these concerns and criticisms are not necessarily well founded, nor
do they capture the full picture. And the potential benefits of room-
sharing to the twenty-first-century city necessitates accommodation
18. See, e.g., AIRBNB, supra note 1; McAlone, supra note 17.





22. See id. (noting that Airbnb is the third most valuable private company in the world).
This valuation likely will diminish, however, once regulations force Airbnb to behave more
like a hotel chain. See Leila Abboud, Uber and Airbnb, It’s Time to Get Real, BLOOMBERG
GADFLY (Nov. 7, 2016, 5:15 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2016-11-07/time-
for-uber-and-airbnb-to-get-real [https://perma.cc/UAC5-GY7J] (noting Airbnb’s growth stag-
nation after Berlin implemented restrictions on short-term rentals). 
23. See Megan Barber, Airbnb vs. the City: How Short-Term Rentals Are Changing Urban
Neighborhoods, CURBED (Nov. 10, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.curbed.com/2016/11/10/13582
982/airbnb-laws-us-cities [https://perma.cc/HRM2-8KQA]. By 2025, analysts project Airbnb
will bring in $335 billion in revenue. See Joseph Shuford, Hotel, Motel, Holiday Inn and Peer-
to-Peer Rentals: The Sharing Economy, North Carolina, and the Constitution, 16 N.C. J.L. &
TECH. ONLINE 301, 310 (2015) (noting that such a projection would be a “2,200 percent
increase in 12 years”). 
24. See Mitra, supra note 19 (“Airbnb has been venture funded so far. [In total, i]t has
raised $3.4 billion from investors.”).
25. See infra Part I.A.
2017] iTENANT 737
for, and fair regulation of, Airbnb moving forward.26 The next two
subparts will consider the major criticisms of Airbnb, studying the
validity of those concerns and the potential for meaningful regula-
tions to target negative externalities while allowing room-sharing
to benefit local economies in a significant way.
A. Economic and Societal Impacts and Criticisms
Economically, Airbnb contributes more tourist dollars per guest
than comparable hotel lodgings.27 Much of this economic benefit is
attributable to two factors: (1) Airbnb helps guests save money on
lodging, allowing them to stay longer, spend more on other expens-
es, or both;28 and (2) whereas hotels are often clustered in a par-
ticular district, the locations of Airbnb listings are widely dispersed
throughout cities, spreading the impact of Airbnb guests’ spending.29
In addition, Airbnb accommodations benefit localities that host
large, seminal events (for example, festivals and concerts) that price
many potential tourists out of a city as hotel rates skyrocket.30
26. For more on how Airbnb spurs a reconceptualization of the twenty-first-century city,
see infra Part I.A.3. 
27. See Roberta A. Kaplan & Michael L. Nadler, Airbnb: A Case Study in Occupancy
Regulation and Taxation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 103, 104-05 (2015) (“As compared to
tourists staying in hotels, Airbnb guests in New York City tend to stay ... longer and spend
nearly $200 more at local businesses during their visit.” (citing New Study: Airbnb Generated
$632 Million in Economic Activity in New York, AIRBNB (Oct. 22, 2013), https://www.airbnb.
com/press/news/new-study-airbnb-generated-632-million-in-economic-activity-in-new-york
[https://perma.cc/9D5H-VEN2])).
28. See Courtney Banks, Budget Rentals Under Fire, WALL ST. J. (July 22, 2010), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704684604575381390324767922 [https://perma.cc/
3BX7-78ZD] (describing the attraction of Airbnb for “[b]udget-minded travelers”); Craig
Karmin, Airbnb Finds Little Hospitality in New York Market, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2013, 7:41
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304384104579141790931429948 [https://
perma.cc/2R8M-FLLS].
29. See Kaplan & Nadler, supra note 27, at 105 (“[W]hile the vast majority of New York
City hotels are clustered in midtown Manhattan, as of 2013, 82 percent of Airbnb accommoda-
tions were spread across the rest of the city.”); Kate Krader, Airbnb: We Generate $4.5 Billion
Globally for Local Restaurants, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 20, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.bloom
berg.com/news/articles/2016-10-20/airbnb-we-generate-4-5-billion-globally-for-local-
restaurants [https://perma.cc/K5GK-AYBU] (noting Airbnb found “42 percent of guests spend
money in the neighborhoods where they’re staying”). 
30. See, e.g., John Divine, Is Airbnb a Threat to the Hotel Industry?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Nov. 2, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://money.usnews.com/investing/articles/2016-11-02/is-
airbnb-a-threat-to-the-hotel-industry [https://perma.cc/JS2V-P88U] (describing how travelers
who used to skip big cities are now considering them because Airbnb provides an affordable
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Whereas a locality without Airbnb listings might host an event that
fills all of its short-term hotel spaces, localities with Airbnb options
can accommodate more guests. More guests means more money for
local businesses and more taxes for local governments, increasing
the aggregate benefit of an event.31 The extra income for hosts also
injects revenue into local economies.32 These benefits further
compound in localities that, unlike the biggest cities, rely on a few,
specialized events—such as strawberry festivals, fairs, and craft
shows—to bring in most, if not all, of their tourism revenues.33
Airbnb’s economic benefits are only the beginning. The fuller
picture shows the room-sharing economy can both benefit local
economies and meet the demands of regulators intent on addressing
its negative externalities, making meaningful regulation not only a
possibility, but an imperative.34
1. Hotel Industry Criticisms
As Airbnb has risen in popularity, it has come under attack from
institutions that perceive cheaper, short-term rentals as a threat to
their business model. Hoteliers have been particularly critical of the
sharing economy’s impact on their revenues,35 and there is some
alternative). Within its first year, Airbnb helped provide more than six hundred people
attending the Democratic National Convention with housing “when traditional accommoda-
tions in Denver were overbooked.” See Interian, supra note 12, at 133. And, as hotel spaces
fill up, Canadians are turning to Airbnb for the 2017 Canada Day celebrations in Ottawa. See
Vito Pilieci, Likely Hotel Room Shortage for Canada Day 2017 Opens Door for Airbnb, OTTAWA
CITIZEN (Nov. 8, 2016, 6:32 PM), http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/likely-hotel-room-
shortage-for-canada-day-2017-opens-door-for-airbnb [https://perma.cc/T8P4-CQHG].
31. See Kaplan & Nadler, supra note 27, at 105-06.
32. See, e.g., Ally Marotti, Chicago Airbnb Hosts Made $2.6 Million During World Series,
CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 1, 2016, 3:26 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-airbnb-chicago-
cubs-world-series-1102-biz-20161101-story.html [https://perma.cc/3535-VWMH] (“The $2.6
million flowing into Chicago via Airbnb will give a nice temporary punch to the local econo-
my.”). 
33. For the benefits and importance of festivals to small-town communities, see, for ex-
ample, Jessi Stone, Festival Frenzy Fueling Local Economies, SMOKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Apr.
15, 2015, 1:09 PM), http://www.smokymountainnews.com/news/item/15546-festival-frenzy-
fueling-local-economies [https://perma.cc/22YH-P5HU] (“Macon County’s 25,292 households
pay $660 less in state and local taxes as a result of tourism spending.”). 
34. See infra Part I.B.
35. See Bitran, supra note 14, at 506 (“Unfortunately ... the hotel industry’s goal is to
shut down its competition by rallying for overregulation of ‘sharing economies.’” (quoting
Daniel Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Government Policy: The Future of
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reason to worry. At upwards of $30 billion, Airbnb’s market value
is greater than several of the largest hotel companies.36 The room-
sharing service also boasts a much larger stock of rooms and lower
marginal costs to add additional inventory, allowing for faster
growth.37 A recent study found that Airbnb averages nearly 22
percent more guests per night than Hilton Worldwide.38 And Airbnb
has essentially eliminated the need for hotel and vacation rental
brokers—whose job is to help vacationers find places to stay—affect-
ing a wider swath of the hospitality trade than just brick-and-
mortar hotels.39
But “Airbnb’s growth does not necessarily come at the expense of
the hotel industry.”40 Airbnb can in fact alleviate the strain on
hotels during peak seasons and events.41 Rather than directly com-
peting with hotels, Airbnb provides a low-price alternative to
visitors unable to otherwise afford the hotels with which Airbnb
supposedly competes.42 Where Airbnb and hotels do directly compete,
Local Regulation of the “Shared Economy” 29 (N.Y. Univ. Marron Inst. Urban Mgmt. Working
Paper No. 21, 2015), http://marroninstitute.nyu.edu/uploads/content/The_Future_of_Local_
Regulation_of_the_Shared_Economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NUR-S7W5])).
36. See Mitra, supra note 19; see also Bitran, supra note 14, at 505. But Airbnb’s revenues
still fall far short of the largest hotel chains. See Jason Clampet, State of Travel 2016: Airbnb
vs. Hotel Rivals in 6 Charts, SKIFT (May 3, 2016, 7:15 AM), https://skift.com/2016/05/03/state-
of-travel-2016-airbnb-vs-hotel-rivals-in-6-charts/ [https://perma.cc/88RW-CTZA] (showing
$340 million in third quarter revenue for Airbnb in 2015, compared with $3.6 billion for
Marriott and $2.9 billion for Hilton for the same quarter). 
37. See Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 147, 160-61 (2016) (“In other words, the largest hotel chains had fewer rooms,
much slower growth rates, and much lower valuations compared to their revenues than
Airbnb.”); Divine, supra note 30 (noting that it cost hotel giant Marriott $13 billion to expand
its inventory by 375,000 rooms; meanwhile, it cost Airbnb nothing to add one million rooms
to its inventory by 2015). But see Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies and
Regulatory Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate Companies Like Airbnb and Uber?, 19 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 293, 304-05 (2016) (observing that Airbnb’s growth is limited, though nomin-
ally, by the practical difficulties hosts face trying to handle a large number of listings and
storage of personal belongings). 
38. Lara Major, Comment, There’s No Place Like (Your) Home: Evaluating Existing
Models and Proposing Solutions for Room-Sharing Regulation, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 469, 474
(2016). 
39. See Miller, supra note 37, at 163. 
40. Kaplan & Nadler, supra note 27, at 106.
41. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. 
42. See Kaplan & Nadler, supra note 27, at 106. But see Elaine Glusac, Hotels vs. Airbnb:
Let the Battle Begin, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/24/travel/
airbnb-hotels.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/ASJ6-CYPU] (reporting that 31 percent of Airbnb
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the competition creates favorable outcomes for consumers by
decreasing prices and creating better consumer experiences as
hotels are forced to adapt.43
A comprehensive study of Airbnb’s impact on the hotel industry
shows increases in Airbnb listings resulted in only marginal de-
creases in hotel revenues for the same area.44 The study looked at
the hotel industry in Texas and found Airbnb had the greatest
impact on lower-priced, independent hotels providing fewer amen-
ities and not targeted at business travelers (in other words, the
hotels most like the average Airbnb listing).45 Even as business use
increases on Airbnb, hotel chains continue to see growth in business
travel—albeit at a slower rate—and still outpace Airbnb in pure
volume of business guests.46 In fact, in 2015, revenue per available
room—a significant hotel financial metric—grew by 5 percent at
both Marriott and Hilton.47 Where Airbnb does directly compete
with hotel chains, evidence suggests its impact only slightly decreas-
es occupancy rates but significantly decreases hotel room prices—a
benefit to all consumers.48
Mutually exclusive competition between hotels and room-sharing
companies is not necessarily the only option, either. In fact, the
users in 2015 used it for business); Brian Solomon, Airbnb Gets Business Friendly in Growth
Push, FORBES (June 8, 2016, 1:25 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2016/06/08/
airbnb-gets-business-friendly-in-growth-push/#4a83d24cfbf4 [https://perma.cc/4S43-LKXU]
(“Airbnb says more than 50,000 companies have now booked travel through Airbnb for
Business, and 10% of all travel that happens on the platform is for business cases.”).
43. For a discussion on how hotels have started to respond to Airbnb as a competitor, see
Glusac, supra note 42 (noting that hotels have responded to Airbnb by creating experiences
that cater to local cultures, socialization, shared spaces, and technology). 
44. Georgios Zervas et al., The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of
Airbnb on the Hotel Industry 3 (B.U. Sch. Mgmt. Research Paper No. 2013-16, 2016), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2366898## [https://perma.cc/SKG3-SEJ4].
45. See id. at 4. Las Vegas illustrates this phenomenon, where casino-hotels have had
little trouble competing with Airbnb listings that cannot provide the same all-inclusive amen-
ities. See Bradley Seth McNew, Why Las Vegas Casino-Hotels Aren’t Worried About Airbnb,
FOX BUS. (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2016/11/10/why-las-vegas-
casino-hotels-arent-worried-about-airbnb.html [https://perma.cc/MUF7-AAEB].
46. See Kevin May, Large Increase in Business Travelers Found Using Airbnb, TNOOZ
(Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.tnooz.com/article/large-increase-seen-in-corporate-travel-use-of-
airbnb/ [https://perma.cc/5L9J-75A7] (“Concur found that major hotel chains are also
experiencing growth, ... [and] total business travel is still 250 times greater than that on
Airbnb.”).
47. Divine, supra note 30. 
48. See Zervas et al., supra note 44, at 3.
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sharing economy presents opportunities for traditional chains to
expand. As the short-term rental market gains legal recognition,
established hotel chains are already entering the field.49 The same
phenomenon has emerged in the analogous ride-sharing economy,
where taxi companies have developed applications to compete with
Uber and Lyft.50 So hoteliers should not lose hope, but should
instead be prepared to adapt and compete, advocating for legal
recognition and standardized regulation of Airbnb rather than
forcing it further into the underground marketplace. Ultimately,
bringing Airbnb under a clear regulatory framework will simulta-
neously benefit the sharing economy through legitimization and the
hotel industry through fairer competition and new opportunities for
growth—a win-win for consumers and commerce alike.
2. Airbnb and Housing Shortage Concerns
Hoteliers are not the only group to resist the rapid growth of
Airbnb. Landlords and local governments have both criticized the
company for allowing hosts to permanently rent out housing space—
sometimes entire homes and apartments—thereby depriving cities
of much needed living space and increasing rental costs for local
tenants.51 Indeed, there are incentives to rent out a location short
term instead of long term,52 but the causal link between Airbnb and
49. See Miller, supra note 37, at 164-65 (claiming hotels likely would seek to enter the
short-term rental market if major cities took action to legalize home-sharing); see also, e.g.,
Edelman & Geradin, supra note 37, at 304 (“[S]ome hotels even list rooms on Airbnb.”);
Glusac, supra note 42 (“AccorHotels, the French hotel company whose brands include Sofitel
and Raffles, has invested directly in the sharing economy, in its acquisition of Onefinestay,
a London-based home sharing service that focuses on the high-end market.”). 
50. See Miller, supra note 37, at 165. 
51. See OFFICE OF THE N.Y. STATE ATT’Y GEN., AIRBNB IN THE CITY 3, 12 (2014); Dana
Palombo, Comment, A Tale of Two Cities: The Regulatory Battle to Incorporate Short-Term
Rentals into Modern Law, 4 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 287, 310-11 (2015) (“In 2014, City Attorney
David Herrera filed two lawsuits against landlords in San Francisco because they each used
residential properties as illegal hotels, making those spaces unavailable to permanent renters
while San Francisco was in a housing shortage.”); Barber, supra note 23. Tenants have even
gone so far as to coin the term “Airbnb’d” to describe the practice of landlords kicking them
out—often illegally—to make room for Airbnb guests. See Steven Hill, The Unsavory Side of
Airbnb, AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 19, 2015), http://prospect.org/article/evictions-and-conversions-
dark-side-airbnb [https://perma.cc/3ZFE-7BDW].
52. See Barber, supra note 23 (stating that it takes “just 83 nights” of renting on Airbnb
in Los Angeles to bring in the same revenue as a year-long lease).
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skyrocketing rent is not as definite as critics suggest.53 “[T]he San
Francisco Chronicle[, for example,] confirmed that 86 percent of
Airbnb users in San Francisco had only one residence listed, and 98
percent had three or fewer, suggesting that only a miniscule
proportion of users seek to operate on a commercial scale.”54 Airbnb
is also unlikely to impact rental prices in the most expensive
neighborhoods, where long-term renting is more profitable.55 If
anything, Airbnb helps tenants afford their rent by sharing their
living space with short-term (one or two night) guests, serving land-
lords’ interests in receiving on-time payments and avoiding eviction
proceedings.56
Although there are concerns that Airbnb increases rental costs,
the real culprit, if any, is commercialization of the platform,57 an is-
sue states and localities can tackle without exterminating Airbnb
altogether.58 Localities have the means to alter the regulatory
53. See Miller, supra note 37, at 182 (noting uncertainty over whether the short-term
rental market has had a significant effect on rent or real estate pricing); Jim Edwards, Here’s
Exactly What Airbnb Does to Rent in Popular Cities, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 20, 2016, 5:00 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/statistics-data-airbnb-rent-prices-2016-10 [https://perma.cc/
94RC-PWS3] (“[I]t [is] not possible to say definitively that Airbnb puts up the prices of rents
and properties.”); see also Allie Howell & Jared Meyer, Don’t Blame Airbnb for New York
City’s High Rents, REASON.COM (Oct. 15, 2016), http://reason.com/archives/2016/10/15/dont-
blame-airbnb-for-new-york-citys-hig [https://perma.cc/36RA-NRUM] (arguing that land use
regulations, rent controls, and construction costs are the more likely causes of high rent in
New York City given Airbnb’s miniscule share of the market).
54. Kaplan & Nadler, supra note 27, at 107 (citing Carolyn Said, Window into Airbnb’s
Hidden Impact on SF, S.F. CHRON. (June 15, 2014), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/item/
window-into-airbnb-s-hidden-impact-on-s-f-30110.php [https://perma.cc/S2XQ-9JZ7]). That
said, commercial users do make a substantial amount of the overall revenue. See Shuford,
supra note 23, at 311-12 (“[I]n New York City, commercial Airbnb renters generated thirty-
seven percent of the total revenue of Airbnb users, despite representing just six percent of
Airbnb hosts.”).
55. See Edwards, supra note 53. 
56. See Bitran, supra note 14, at 510; Kaplan & Nadler, supra note 27, at 106-07.
57. See Ariel Stulberg, Airbnb Probably Isn’t Driving Rents up Much, at Least Not Yet,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 24, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features /airbnb-
probably-isnt-driving-rents-up-much-at-least-not-yet/ [https://perma.cc/QRM9-RRNV] (de-
scribing the impact of commercialized Airbnb listings on rental markets and the profitability
of commercial listings). 
58. See, e.g., Carolyn Said, Window into Airbnb’s Hidden Impact on S.F., S.F. CHRON.
(June 2014), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/item/window-into-airbnb-s-hidden-impact-
on-s-f-30110.php [https://perma.cc/S2XQ-9JZ7] (describing legislation in San Francisco that
would legalize room-sharing services while regulating their operations). For a summary of
Airbnb regulations in the United States, see Interian, supra note 12, at 146-48.
2017] iTENANT 743
landscape so as to permit short-term rentals while cracking down on
abusive landlords who evict long-term tenants in order to charge
exorbitant rent to short-term guests.59 Chicago and San Francisco,
for instance, have both required hosts to register with the city,
allowing better monitoring of abusive and detrimental renting.60
Airbnb itself has taken measures to prevent commercialization of
the platform in San Francisco.61 And treating Airbnb hosts as
innkeepers is likely to dissuade landlords from leaving the long-
term rental market because of the greater liability they must
assume for guests on their premises.62 If landlords want to try and
profit from short-term rental schemes to the detriment of long-term
tenants, they should assume greater responsibility for guest safety.
One thing is clear: the concerns that local governments have about
Airbnb’s impact on rent prices can be addressed through precise
regulation aimed at limiting commercialization, without the need
for abolition en masse.
3. Short-Term Rentals and Community Harmony
Critiques of Airbnb’s disruptive impact do not end with rental
markets; community planners have also attacked transient occupan-
cy as a threat to the economic and social stability of neighbor-
hoods.63 Specifically, public officials and residential constituents
have opined that zoning for renters in a neighborhood leads to
increased traffic and other community disruptions.64 Many contend
59. See, e.g., Palombo, supra note 51, at 311-12 (noting that San Francisco’s Ellis Act
permits landlords to rent short-term, but does not allow them to evict tenants for those pur-
poses); Said, supra note 58.
60. See Mitra, supra note 19. But enforcement of these requirements has not been easy.
See id. 
61. See One Host, One Home: San Francisco, AIRBNB CITIZEN (Oct. 24, 2016), https://san-
francisco.airbnbcitizen.com/one-host-one-home-san-francisco/ [https://perma.cc/M4J5-T9CM].
62. For the specific liability imputed to innkeepers, see infra Part II.B. 
63. See, e.g., Palombo, supra note 51, at 306 (arguing that altering a zoning district from
residential to commercial to accommodate short-term rentals threatens to undermine the
stability of residential areas).
64. These concerns have been used by cities in legal arguments. See City of New York v.
Smart Apartments LLC, 959 N.Y.S. 2d 890, 892 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (“[The City argues that
transient residents] bother the non-transient residents ... because [they] host loud, late night
parties; vomit, dump garbage; .... and generally do not conduct themselves in the civilized,
genteel manner of the locals.”).
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that renters do not have the same incentives as a homeowner to
maintain their residence, and therefore rental properties will be
poorly kept and cause depreciated home values for everyone else.65
Others worry Airbnb creates transience in communities, causing
them to lose a valuable social asset: neighbors.66 But these negative
attributes of renters are not necessarily fair,67 and the rise of the
sharing economy raises new questions about the desirability of
single-use zoning districts in the first place.68
Of course, disruptions to communities are valid concerns for
zoning commissions and local governments, but the exclusion of
short-term renters, particularly Airbnb users, goes no further to
help protect community harmony than other policies that already
preserve home values and neighborhood tranquility (for example,
home manicure ordinances and nuisance laws).69 In fact, the sharing
economy is a cheaper tool cities can use to redevelop and revitalize
areas that otherwise cannot compete with more affordable land in
the suburbs.70 Sharing economy applications also provide services
that assist local governments in giving full-service accommodations
to their constituents and consumers, making a locality more attrac-
tive to visitors, residents, and businesses.71 Thus, the sharing
economy, and Airbnb in particular, may actually help cities get more
out of underused and underdeveloped areas, creating multi-use
65. See Ngai Pindell, Home Sweet Home? The Efficacy of Rental Restrictions to Promote
Neighborhood Stability, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 41, 72 (2009). 
66. See Barber, supra note 23 (“In popular tourist destinations ... the sound of rolling
suitcases and calls for ‘housekeeping’ have replaced neighborly meetups.”). 
67. See Pindell, supra note 65, at 46-47 (“Negative impacts on a community commonly
ascribed to renters—overcrowding, short-term horizons, increased traffic, limited care of prop-
erty—can also be attributed to many owners.”). 
68. See Miller, supra note 37, at 167 (“The [Short-Term Rental] Market may ... usher in
a new era in which extended stays become a part of the hotel districts.”); id. at 158 (pointing
out the limited land available to cities from which to gain profit and arguing that “[t]he
sharing economy ... offers a second bite at the apple for those jurisdictions that have already
built out their land”). 
69. See id. at 199.
70. See id. at 159 (“[The] monetization opportunity [of previously non-monetized neigh-
borhoods] provide[s] cities a way to reconceptualize the cities’ economies with a much lighter
touch than the traditional tools—annexation, redevelopment, infrastructure—have typically
required.”).
71. See id. (noting the advantages Airbnb-style accommodations provide to families with
small children over the typical hotel accommodations). 
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neighborhoods that offer revenue to urban dwellers, while maintain-
ing or enhancing the desirable attributes of community.
Notably, Airbnb claims its mission is to develop communities by
bringing the purely commercial relationship of guest and innkeeper
to a personal level, connecting strangers and exposing communities
to diverse perspectives.72 One could argue this diversification makes
communities stronger.73 Additionally, Airbnb nets higher profits to
homeowners, incentivizing reinvestment in Airbnb listings and im-
proving the commercial value of homes in a given area.74
So the question is not so much whether Airbnb has ruined the
neighborhood as we know it, but whether the neighborhood as we
know it is even worth preserving—or if it even exists. The sharing
economy likely is not the cause of the vast changes seen in neighbor-
hood communities today. Rather, Airbnb could well be a symptom
of a twenty-first-century lifestyle that is less localized and more
globalized, and connected via larger webs of online communities.
What the urban communities of nineteenth-century America have
lost, the sharing economy has the potential to replace and enhance
with a new perspective on what it means to live and act in a global
community from the comfort of one’s own home.
4. Short-Term Rental Markets and Housing Speculation
There are legitimate concerns, however, that permissively allow-
ing short-term rentals in the residential housing market will en-
courage speculation in home prices, creating artificial and unstable
housing bubbles.75 Speculative homebuyers purchase residential
homes in hopes that housing prices will increase and they can sell
the home a short time after purchasing for a quick return on their
72. See Brian Chesky, Belong Anywhere, AIRBNB BLOG (July 16, 2014), http://blog.
airbnb.com/belong-anywhere/ [https://perma.cc/2EDD-V4PM]; see also Barber, supra note 23
(“They’ve taken something that’s been a purely commercial endeavor—renting a hotel room—
and made it personal, too.”). 
73. See Miller, supra note 37, at 184 (equating the relationship short-term renters build
with their neighbors to those built while backpacking across Europe, redefining what “neigh-
borhood” will mean in the future). 
74. See, e.g., Barber, supra note 23 (“[The Airbnb host has] since reinvested much of his
revenue back into the property through renovations.”).
75. See Pindell, supra note 65, at 65. 
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investment.76 In the meantime, speculators rent out the investment
homes to short-term tenants to cushion costs.77 Speculation results
in unnatural increases in housing demand, which in turn increases
home prices, requiring lenders to extend greater amounts of credit
to other homebuyers with the expectation prices will continue to
increase.78 When the bubble bursts, however, homeowners are left
with mortgages they cannot afford and homes that banks refuse to
refinance, leading to widespread foreclosures and neighborhood
degradation.79 And the individual homeowners are not the only ones
who suffer when the housing bubble collapses. Local educational,
social, and governmental institutions are all affected.80
Although unproven, in theory Airbnb helps speculators rent out
investment homes to short-term guests, which only compounds the
harmful effect of speculation on long-term housing prices. Indeed,
Airbnb can itself induce speculation by increasing property prices in
areas tourists frequently rent via the room-sharing economy, where
the expectation of rental revenues artificially increases property
values.81 If and when a catastrophic event (for example, disease,
terror attack, or a natural disaster) occurs, tourists are driven away
and the realization of additional revenues is undermined, thereby
collapsing the Airbnb bubble.82
Because of its potential impact on speculation, local decision mak-
ers are understandably hesitant to change zoning ordinances to
allow short-term rentals. But these concerns ignore other ways to
regulate speculation sales (for example, Vermont’s land gains tax on
short-term sales).83 And the causal connection between short-term
rental platforms and speculation is far from concrete. Speculation
76. See id. at 66.
77. Cf. id. at 67-68 (discussing the problems renters face when banks foreclose on specu-
lators’ homes).
78. See id. at 66-67.
79. See id. at 67 (“Foreclosed houses can remain vacant for months or even years, falling
into disrepair and becoming susceptible to vandalism or other property crimes.”).
80. See id. (“[Foreclosed homeowners’] children can experience significant educational and
social disruption. Surrounding homeowners can also suffer.... Cities face falling property tax
revenue, as well as increased administrative costs.”).
81. See Barber, supra note 23 (discussing the effects of short-term renting on housing and
long-term rental prices). 
82. See id. 
83. For the options available to localities when regulating speculative sales, and the
challenges they face, see Pindell, supra note 65, at 68-71. 
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existed before the room-sharing economy thrived, so calling it an
Airbnb problem improperly frames the issue, confusing an enabling
factor with the problem’s root causes.84 Localities have several
regulatory options that promote a revenue-generating sharing econ-
omy while also mitigating the risks of speculation. This is not unlike
any other complex community planning issue, with myriad solutions
of varying effectiveness.85
B. The Opportunity for Meaningful Regulation
In recent years, the municipalities most affected by Airbnb have
responded by ratcheting up fines and punishing room-sharing hosts.
Austin, Texas, for example, banned advertising for short-term
rentals in February 2016.86 In March 2016, Miami Beach amended
its city code, providing for fines up to $20,000 for anyone renting for
periods of less than six months.87 And New York State passed one
of the toughest laws to combat the short-term rental economy, fining
anyone who advertises short-term stays in unoccupied apartments.88
Even cities that do not prohibit room-sharing per se have construed
existing codes to punish Airbnb hosts.89 But eliminating short-term
rentals altogether is neither appropriate nor practical.
Despite opposition from hoteliers, landlords, and policymakers,
reality suggests the room-sharing economy fills an underserved
niche in the market that operates to promote the aggregate amount
of tourism revenue in any given locale.90 There are some concerns
the room-sharing economy can be abused to operate illegal hotels
that deprive deserving local tenants of long-term rental space, but
there is little evidence to show that Airbnb has actually impacted
84. See Miller, supra note 37, at 182 (“[T]he [Short-Term Rental] Market has not had an
appreciable difference on real estate purchase prices.”). 
85. Notably, one option—exclusion of renters altogether—presents fair housing concerns.
See Pindell, supra note 65, at 71-72. 
86. See Barber, supra note 23.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See, e.g., Major, supra note 38, at 472 (“While no San Diego code provision specifically
addresses room-sharing, the court reasoned that room-sharing potentially implicates several
sections.... Because [the Airbnb host] operated an illegal bed and breakfast for at least part
of the time, the court found [her] liable.”). 
90. See supra Part I.A. 
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rental prices by any appreciable measure.91 And there are means to
regulate commercializing the platform without eliminating the
sharing economy. The opportunity to regulate the room-sharing
economy in a meaningful way, while enabling it to serve local
interests, is ripe for the taking.92 Overregulation threatens to only
hurt localities by promoting exclusive industry cartels and monopo-
lies at a cost to consumers and local governments.93 It also makes
practical sense to accept that Airbnb, as a titan of the sharing
economy, is here to stay and too big to fail; and trying to force it out
of business goes against the tides of modern prosumerism.94
Although regulation is certainly needed, punishing hosts while
taxing their revenue creates a regulatory mismatch—legitimizing
the sharing economy on the one hand and pushing it further
underground on the other. As this Note will analyze in the next
three parts, one way to meaningfully regulate Airbnb is to move
hosts outside of the landlord-tenant framework and into the realm
of innkeeper regulation.
91. See supra Part I.A.2. 
92. For a discussion of how one city (San Francisco) embraced Airbnb and other short-
term rental sites, and the opposition that embrace now faces, see Palombo, supra note 51, at
313-17 (“Legislation was passed ... that legalizes short-term rentals in a highly regulated
manner, by limiting the rentals to ninety nights per year, and requiring permanent residents
to occupy their homes for at least 275 days per year.”).
93. See Bitran, supra note 14, at 512 (“A tax memo estimates that San Francisco will lose
approximately $58 million in tax revenue if [a proposed room-sharing regulation] passes,
because the legislation would limit homes to seventy-five rental nights annually.”); see also
id. at 536 (“If ... hotels want to compete with the technology-created sharing economy ..., then
they need to improve their services and efficiency, not ban competition.”); Palombo, supra note
51, at 318. 
94. See Bitran, supra note 14, at 528-29; see also Palombo, supra note 51, at 318.
“Prosumerism” is a term coined for the sharing economy participants who are both traditional
consumers in the economy and producers of their own products and services sold on sharing
economy sites. See The New Consumer and the Sharing Economy, HAVAS WORLDWIDE: THE
MAG (June 26, 2015), http://mag.havas.com/prosumer-report/the-new-consumer-and-the-
sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/9YVA-6C8B]. For recent research on trends toward
prosumerism and the collaborative economy, see generally id. 
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II. A SUMMARY OF LANDLORD-TENANT AND INNKEEPER DOCTRINES
Much commentary exists about Airbnb’s impact on housing and
hospitality and ways to tax and regulate its negative externalities,
but current literature and law have assumed that it is only natur-
al—or simply an accepted part of the legal landscape—for hosts to
be treated as landlords and their guests as tenants.95 Regulating
hosts as landlords is admittedly not the worst circumstance for
hosts, who can avoid liability for many injuries guests might incur
on their property.96 But, as Part III will discuss, the advantages to
hosts come at a cost to Airbnb guests, and the current legal land-
scape misunderstands the position Airbnb guests—even those stay-
ing over thirty days— are in.97 This Part will juxtapose the basic
legal frameworks for the landlord-tenant and innkeeper doctrines,
previewing the particular implications of each for Airbnb hosts.
A. Landlord-Tenant Treatment of Airbnb Hosts
For two main reasons, New York and California have become
bellwethers for the doctrinal treatment of Airbnb hosts in other
parts of the nation. First, by sheer volume, New York and California
are the jurisdictional homes of Airbnb’s largest U.S. markets by
active listings (New York City and Los Angeles),98 and the company
itself is headquartered in San Francisco.99 Second, New York and
California have given rise to the most extensive litigation on a rel-
atively new issue.100 Finally, localities in both states have already
taken various regulatory steps to adapt to, prohibit, or accommodate
95. See Loucks, supra note 9, at 334 (“Some jurisdictions treat Airbnb hosts as landlords
instead of innkeepers or mere property owners granting gratuitous licenses.”); infra Part II.A. 
96. See Loucks, supra note 9, at 334.
97. See id. (“[Treating hosts as landlords] seems somewhat counterintuitive because
Airbnb guests are more analogous to a hotel guest or a mere licensee, rather than a tenant
who holds some interest in the property.”). 
98. See Fast Facts, AIRBNB, https://press.atairbnb.com/fast-facts/ [https://perma.cc/DC9G-
SW4Y]. 
99. See Salter, supra note 13.
100. See, e.g., Katie Benner, Airbnb in Disputes with New York and San Franciso, N.Y.
TIMES (June 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/29/technology/airbnb-sues-san-
francisco-over-a-law-it-had-helped-pass.html [https://perma.cc/9EH9-NT79].
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Airbnb. Looking at these two states, therefore, provides key insights
into the current legal framework surrounding Airbnb host-guest
relationships.101
In California, state law allocates tenant rights to any guests
staying over thirty days.102 To avoid this classification, Airbnb hosts
must meet impractical requirements.103 Specifically, in addition to
maintaining the right of access and control, California law requires
those wishing to avoid landlord classification to provide all of the
following services to guests: (1) a fireproof safe; (2) a central tele-
phone service; (3) maid, mail, and room service; and (4) food service
by an establishment within the hotel or operated in conjunction
therewith.104 For obvious reasons, few—if any—Airbnb listings
provide the requisite services and right of entry that allow hosts to
escape characterization as a landlord. In a state where tenants are
granted considerable rights, Airbnb hosts face significant obstacles
if they have unruly or obstinate guests.105
Likewise, in New York State, the courts have characterized
Airbnb hosts as landlords when determining whether hosts can rent
out property zoned for permanent residences.106 In City of New York
v. Smart Apartments LLC, for example, the court treated Smart
Apartment’s owners, who used a room-sharing method to rent out
rooms, as landlords, not innkeepers, even when hosting transient
guests for under thirty days.107 Similarly, in Airbnb, Inc. v. Schneid-
erman, the court agreed to allow New York’s Attorney General to
101. See Dara Kerr, Airbnb Dealt Blow as Judge Rejects Bid to Block SF Law, CNET (Nov.
8, 2016, 5:40 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/airbnb-dealt-blow-judge-rejects-bid-to-block-
law-san-francisco/ [https://perma.cc/9L5P-C2RD] (“[L]awmakers throughout the US are
looking to San Francisco to set an example of how to regulate [Airbnb].”). 
102. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1940(a)-(b)(1) (West 2017); CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 7280(a)
(West 2017).
103. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1940(a).
104. See id. § 1940(b)(2).
105. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
106. See Airbnb, Inc. v. Schneiderman, 989 N.Y.S.2d 786, 790-91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (hold-
ing the Attorney General had a factual basis to find violations of New York’s Multiple Dwell-
ing Law because Airbnb hosts were renting out living space for less than thirty days while not
also residing in the same residence, thereby acting as landlords). The court denied the sub-
poena on other grounds. Id. at 792; see also City of New York v. Smart Apartments LLC, 959
N.Y.S.2d 890, 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (enjoining Smart Apartments from renting to transient
occupants of less than 30 days in part because it violated the Multiple Dwelling Law that
prohibits landlords from renting to short-term guests without also residing in the residence).
107. See 959 N.Y.S.2d at 892-93. 
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subpoena records of 124 Airbnb hosts suspected of operating illegal
hotels, implying the hosts were landlords and not hoteliers.108
Legally, classifying Airbnb hosts as landlords means hosts have
reduced liability for guest injuries and increased difficulty evicting
squatters. Under the laws of a majority of states, landlords are li-
able for physical injuries to tenants resulting from the landlord’s
failure to repair a dangerous condition.109 For liability to impute,
furthermore, the dangerous condition must violate either: “(1) an
implied warranty of habitability; or (2) a duty created by statute or
administrative regulation.”110 Landlords are subject to liability only
for conditions about which they are aware, could have discovered
with the exercise of reasonable care, or are given notice by the
tenant.111 Thus, the law acts to limit a landlord’s liability for harm
to tenants by first requiring the landlord’s reasonable awareness,
and, even if the landlord is aware, further requiring the dangerous
condition be one that violates the warranty of habitability or other
law. In many jurisdictions—even those with more tenant-friendly
laws112—the warranty of habitability is a minimal standard, re-
quiring landlords to provide only a basic level of sanitation, heat,
and structural integrity.113 In effect, landlords need only repair
those conditions that seriously impact the ability of one to live in
reasonable comfort and good health.114 Even if a landlord violates
108. See Palombo, supra note 51, at 302-03. 
109. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 18.3 (AM. LAW INST.
1977).
110. Id. 
111. Id. cmt. c. 
112. See, e.g., Dealing with Problems, CAL. DEP’T CONSUMER AFF., http://www.dca.ca.gov/
publications/landlordbook/problems.shtml [https://perma.cc/SA73-TV58] (outlining the basic
habitability requirements and noting “[t]he implied warranty of habitability is not violated
merely because the rental unit is not in perfect, aesthetically pleasing condition ... [nor] if
there are minor housing code violations”). 
113. The most basic requirements of the implied warranty are: (1) a structurally sound
roof; (2) functioning heat and hot water; (3) access to clean water; (4) adequate lighting;
(5) walls and floors not at risk of collapse; (6) the absence of lead, asbestos, and mold; (7) a
functioning sewage system; (8) door locks; and (9) functioning smoke alarms throughout the
tenancy. Implied Warranty of Habitability, LEGAL DICTIONARY, http://legaldictionary.net/
implied-warranty-of-habitability/ [https://perma.cc/93XC-8PCL]. 
114. See Myron Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine Raising
New Issues, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1444, 1458 (1974) (“[Some courts] have indicated that the
warranty requires defects serious enough to have constituted a constructive eviction.”).
Moskovitz also points out that “[d]eprivation of essential residential functions” is a common
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the warranty, moreover, some courts afford landlords reasonable
time to repair the problem.115
In the Airbnb context, guests are unlikely to be familiar enough
with the property—or be at a property long enough to become
familiar—that either giving notice or granting reasonable time for
repair is impractical.116 Even if notice and reasonable time were
possible, many risks that do not affect the habitability of a listing
are nonetheless threatening and undiscoverable to a temporary
guest.117
Although enjoying limited liability for guest safety, Airbnb
landlord-hosts are constrained by laws proscribing self-help when
evicting holdover tenants. As a general rule, if a “speedy” judicial
remedy (for example, summary proceeding) exists, a landlord may
not evict or exclude a tenant from a leasehold property using their
own resources.118 Thus, state law prohibits Airbnb hosts classified
as landlords from evicting an unruly guest extrajudicially, creating
a tremendous burden for the host that exceeds the intentions of the
Airbnb relationship.119
For these and many other reasons discussed in Part III, the
landlord-tenant approach to the room-sharing economy is incongru-
ent and improper, applying traditional law to an untraditional
market.
threshold among warranty of habitability decisions. Id. at 1459. Essentially, so long as the
tenant can eat, sleep, and go to the bathroom, the landlord will have satisfied the warranty.
See id.
115. See id. at 1462-63. 
116. See Airbnb, Inc., Airbnb Economic Impact, AIRBNB BLOG, http://blog.atairbnb.com/
economic-impact-airbnb/ [https://perma.cc/QNQ7-TBM6] (noting that Airbnb guests stay on
average 5.5 days in San Francisco and 6.4 nights in New York).
117. See, e.g., infra notes 194-97. 
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 14.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
119. See, e.g., supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
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B. A Summary of Innkeeper Doctrine
In contrast to the duties and rights of landlords, the long-standing
innkeeper doctrine better protects guests and allows hosts to evict
disruptive lodgers at will. As Part IV will argue, these two charac-
teristics are among the primary reasons why the innkeeper doctrine
is a better regulatory approach for Airbnb hosts.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts summarizes a long-held duty
imputed to innkeepers at common law. An innkeeper is held to have
a special relationship with his guests that creates a duty for the
innkeeper to protect said guests “against unreasonable risk of phys-
ical harm, and ... to give them first aid.”120 This duty is an exception
to the general rule of negligence that recognizing the need to aid
others does not itself impose a duty to act.121 Innkeepers, by way of
their relation to a guest, have a duty to obviate any unreasonable
risk of harm that might arise out of the guest’s stay on the inn-
keeper’s premises.122 In addition, innkeepers have a duty to provide
aid to guests for injuries or illnesses arising from natural causes,
pure accident, or third parties.123 The duty to protect and aid guests
does not apply when the innkeeper does not know, or has no reason
to know or anticipate, a risk to the guest.124 Thus, the law serves to
impute greater liability to innkeepers by expanding the situations
in which an innkeeper would have a duty to protect, warn, and cure
guests of risks and harms. Although the innkeeper must still have
actual knowledge, or reason to know, of risks, the duty imputed to
innkeepers naturally requires more consideration of guests’ inter-
ests and safety than is required in a landlord-tenant relationship.125
Furthermore, treating hosts as innkeepers is not just a benefit to
guests. As stressed throughout this Note, innkeeper-hosts generally
have a greater right to evict guests using self-help.126 In particular,
innkeepers may evict guests so long as the reasons for the eviction
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(1)-(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
121. Id. cmt. b.
122. Id. cmt. c. 
123. Id. cmt. d. 
124. Id. cmt. e. 
125. Compare id. § 314A(1)-(2), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD &
TENANT § 18.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
126. See 43A C.J.S. Inns, Hotels, and Eating Places § 24 (2017).
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are valid and the innkeeper does not use excessive force.127 Valid
reasons include the guest’s failure to pay, violations of the law, or
general misconduct.128 The law still protects guests conducting
themselves “in a proper and peaceful manner,” preventing abuse of
the eviction right.129 For this and several other reasons, the inn-
keeper approach better reflects the relationship at play in the room-
sharing economy.130
III. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE LANDLORD-TENANT APPROACH
This Part will outline three primary concerns with the landlord-
tenant approach to Airbnb, specifically: (1) the mismatch between
the treatment of Airbnb hosts as landlords and the intent of the
parties entering the relationship; (2) Airbnb’s own claims of corpo-
rate impunity, leaving guests with little redress if hosts also lack a
duty to warn and protect; and (3) the incongruence of the exploit-
ative theory behind landlord-tenant law and the collaborative
theory reinvigorated by the sharing economy.
A. The Mismatch of Legal Treatment and Actual Practice
A large problem with the landlord-tenant approach to Airbnb is
that the doctrinal treatment fails to account for the actual interests
of the parties in a room-sharing relationship. Airbnb aims to connect
guests with local hosts, bringing guests directly into unfamiliar
environments where they can interact with a given destination in
an organic way.131 Airbnb users are looking for a temporary roof
over their heads and the potential insights of a local; they do not




130. See infra Part IV. 
131. See AIRBNB, supra note 1. As Airbnb co-founder, Brian Chesky, explained, “Airbnb is
about so much more than just renting space .... It’s about people and experiences.... You’re not
just getting a room, you’re getting a sense of belonging.” Burt Helm, Airbnb Is Inc.’s 2014
Company of the Year, INC. (Dec. 2014-Jan. 2015), http://www.inc.com/magazine/201412/burt-
helm/airbnb-company-of-the-year-2014.html [https://perma.cc/QZB5-SXDE]. 
132. See Loucks, supra note 9, at 334 (noting that Airbnb guests are more analogous to
hotel guests than to tenants with a legal interest in a property). 
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Yet, the landlord perspective assumes guests desire, or even need,
a leasehold interest in a particular listing.
Even if the parties did desire to create a landlord-tenant relation-
ship, Airbnb itself implicitly undermines the creation of tenancies.
Unlike landlords, who often require extensive background informa-
tion and references before renting property,133 Airbnb hosts—even
for long-term guests—rely on informal, less thorough means to
predict guest behavior.134 The checks Airbnb does provide, moreover,
are unlikely to pick up all red flags concerning past crimes, or a
guest’s propensity to be dangerous and destructive.135 The bulwark
of Airbnb’s verification program, for example, is the site’s two-way
review system, whereby guests and hosts review each other after a
transaction ends, attaching the review to that person’s profile for
other users to see.136 But the veracity and depth of such reviews is
vulnerable to the pressures of social norms and business incen-
tives.137 Granted, truly awful guests are unlikely to escape without
133. See, e.g., Eric Dunn & Marina Grabchuk, Background Checks and Social Effects: Con-
temporary Residential Tenant-Screening Problems in Washington State, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC.
JUST. 319, 320 (2010) (“In today’s age of online public records and digital transmission, a
rental applicant’s complete residential history, credit report, criminal record, civil litigation
background, and other information are available within hours or even minutes.”). 
134. See I’m a Host. What Are Some Safety Tips I Can Follow?, AIRBNB, https://www.
airbnb.com/help/article/231/i-m-a-host--what-are-some-safety-tips-i-can-follow [https://perma.
cc/VXA8-KA9K] (discussing various means for hosts to insure guests are who they say they
are, namely: (1) interacting only through Airbnb; (2) providing rules; (3) obtaining insurance;
and (4) establishing requirements such as security deposits and verified ID through the
Airbnb system). Airbnb’s verification of user identities is largely superficial, relying on users
to link to social media accounts and contact information, both of which are easily forged,
though users have the option to share government issued identification. See What Are Profile
Verifications and How Do I Get Them?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/336/
what-are-profile-verifications-and-how-do-i-get-them [https://perma.cc/44K5-NVUX]. 
135. See Does Airbnb Perform Background Checks on Members?, AIRBNB, https://www.
airbnb.com/help/article/1308/does-airbnb-perform-background-checks-on-members [https://
perma.cc/2M2S-PG9Q] (“Although background checks may help ... where records are available
[the] checks don’t always identify a person’s past crimes or other red flags.”) As further
protection, Airbnb holds the reservation fee for the first twenty-four hours of a booking to
allow guests and hosts to make sure things are in order, though it is unlikely an intent to
scam the host or plans for a destructive party are revealed to the host within that timeframe.
See When Am I Charged for a Reservation?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/92/
when-am-i-charged-for-a-reservation [https://perma.cc/BF8M-P332].
136. See How Do Reviews Work?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/13/how-do-
reviews-work [https://perma.cc/UG5Y-NVSF]. 
137. See Molly Mulshine, After a Disappointing Airbnb Stay, I Realized There’s a Major
Flaw in the Review System, BUS. INSIDER (June 18, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.business
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a bad review, but such situations are few and far between, as the re-
view system tilts in the guest’s favor.138 Even badly reviewed guests
can use the instant book feature—pushed by Airbnb in recent
years—to book a stay without any host approval at all.139 The review
system also fails to capture what a particular host cannot see.140
Whereas a guest might be considerably pleasant while staying with
one host, the next stay with a new host could turn out quite differ-
ently.141
Beyond the impracticalities of its verification system, Airbnb
further undermines the creation of tenancies by means of its pay-
ment procedures. Although Airbnb does collect payments for up to
the first month of any booking at the time of a reservation, users
can cancel cards or close payment accounts so Airbnb can no longer
collect payments for nights beyond the first month,142 at which point
insider.com/why-airbnb-reviews-are-a-problem-for-the-site-2015-6 [https://perma.cc/8VZ2-
NDP5] (“[T]he problem is that these reviews aren’t anonymous, and I believe this causes
people ... to post reviews that lean positive.”). Users, moreover, can choose to abstain from
submitting a review instead of providing a negative evaluation of a guest (or host). AIRBNB,
supra note 136. But Airbnb has improved the review system to reduce incentives to play nice
and avoid honesty. See Seth Porges, The Strange Game Theory of Airbnb Reviews, FORBES
(Oct. 17, 2014, 2:21 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sethporges/2014/10/17/the-strange-
game-theory-of-airbnb-reviews/#781da3e15e56 [https://perma.cc/J5PN-TUSD] (describing how
Airbnb’s new double-blind review system encourages hosts to be more honest about guests).
138. See Seth Porges, The One Issue with Airbnb Reviews that Causes Hosts to Burnout,
FORBES (June 29, 2016, 9:15 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sethporges/2016/06/29/the-one-
issue-with-airbnb-reviews-that-causes-hosts-to-burnout/#1957b6ff36a9 [https://perma.cc/
LBT6-4B8X] (noting that ratings below five stars can affect the ranking of the host’s listing
in a search and loss of the “Super Host” title). Airbnb hosts can also reserve criticism of guests
for private feedback, seen only by the specific guest, preventing future hosts from under-
standing the full picture. AIRBNB, supra note 136. 
139. See What Is Instant Book?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/523/what-is-
instant-book [https://perma.cc/53UQ-QJ9W]. Airbnb touts instant booking as a means to
prevent host discrimination. See Katie Benner, Airbnb Adopts Rules to Fight Discrimination
by Its Hosts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/technology/
airbnb-anti-discrimination-rules.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/K7W7-BSUJ].
140. See Edelman & Geradin, supra note 37, at 317.
141. See Georgios Zervas, David Proserpio & John W. Byers, A First Look at Online Repu-
tation on Airbnb, Where Every Stay Is Above Average 5 (Apr. 12, 2015) (unpublished manu-
script), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2554500 [https://perma.cc/AG3M-UGZB] (noting that hosts
cannot see an overall average of a guest’s ratings, requiring hosts to read through user-
supplied information to catch any red flags). 
142. See How Do I Pay for My Long-Term Reservation?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/
help/article/245/how-do-i-pay-for-my-long-term-reservation [https://perma.cc/D5U5-EMEU];
see also, e.g., supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text. 
2017] iTENANT 757
the guest likely has obtained tenant rights.143 This abuse of the
payment system is the exact issue described in the Introduction,
and leaves hosts vulnerable to squatters and scam artists.144
Thus, if hosts want to create a tenancy, Airbnb is an impractical
forum for doing so, implicitly disincentivizing such behavior by
inhibiting a host’s ability to predict guest behavior and to receive
timely payments. For these practical reasons, and the purpose of the
site generally, one can assume most hosts do not intend to give
guests a legal interest in their property, and most guests do not
intend to seek out such an interest, yet the law currently leaves
Airbnb users with no practical workaround.145 The mismatch of
party intent and landlord-tenant doctrine is further compounded
when considering the difficulty with which an injured guest can
seek legal remedies against either Airbnb or its hosts under the
current framework.146
B. Airbnb’s Corporate Impunity
The lack of liability imputed to Airbnb hosts under landlord-
tenant doctrine is particularly problematic because of the corre-
sponding lack of liability imputed to Airbnb as a company. Fearing
that internet startups would be stifled by litigation and liability
concerns, Congress passed section 230 of the Communications Dec-
ency Act (CDA) in 1996.147 The CDA essentially immunizes Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) from liability for the information and
content posted by an “information content provider.”148 The broad
definition of ISPs protected by the law includes Airbnb because
hosts serve as separate information content providers on the Airbnb
platform.149 The law protects Airbnb from liability for the content
posted by hosts that it does not have a hand in creating, although
courts have limited the scope of this protection to free speech issues
143. See supra Part II.A.
144. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
145. See supra Part II.A.
146. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.B.
147. Interian, supra note 12, at 138.
148. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). 
149. Interian, supra note 12, at 138.
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and not to other claims.150 In recent litigation, for example, the
District Court for the Northern District of California rejected
Airbnb’s argument that a San Francisco ordinance, which made
Airbnb liable for collecting fees from unregistered hosts, violated the
CDA.151 The court found the ordinance did not punish Airbnb for the
actual content hosts posted, so Airbnb was not immune from
sanctions.152 Nonetheless, the court accepted that the law would
protect Airbnb from liability if, say, a host omitted to mention the
poor conditions of a particular location or otherwise lied about the
quality of the accommodations provided.153
The CDA is not the end of Airbnb’s legal immunity arguments,
either. The company can also argue it should not be liable for its
hosts’ torts because each host is an independent contractor and not
an employee—an argument made by the ride-sharing application
Uber with mixed results.154 Although no Airbnb-specific case law yet
exists, Airbnb places fewer restrictions on its hosts and could
therefore argue it should not be liable for its hosts’ negligence.155 If
150. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2008). 
151. Airbnb, Inc. v. City & Cty. of S.F., No. 3:16-cv-03615-JD, 2016 WL 6599821, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2016). For a discussion of the ruling’s implications, see Kerr, supra note 101
(“The home-rental company ... has used similar arguments in its battles with other cities,
including New York. Additionally, lawmakers throughout the US are looking to San Francisco
to set an example of how to regulate the eight-year-old startup.”). 
152. See Airbnb, Inc., 2016 WL 6599821, at *4.
153. See id. at *5 (refusing to preempt the San Francisco ordinance because it “d[id] not
turn on holding an Internet service liable for posting or failing to remove content provided by
a third party,” implying that if the ordinance had held Airbnb liable for what its hosts post
then the CDA would protect it). 
154. Compare McGillis v. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220, 225-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2017) (holding Uber drivers were not employees for the purposes of unemployment
compensation because they provided their own vehicles and controlled “when, where, with
whom, and how to accept and perform trip requests”), with Interian, supra note 12, at 142
(“[Uber] has struggled to cast off responsibility for its drivers by claiming that they are
independent contractors or simply ‘App-users,’ rather than traditional service employees.”).
155. See Interian, supra note 12, at 152-53; see also Palombo, supra note 51, at 299
(“Airbnb contends that it is just a matchmaker, similar to an online dating platform. A dating
site connects two parties ... but what happens from there is not the dating site’s responsi-
bility.”). But Airbnb has started to exert more control over its hosts. See Interian, supra note
12, at 154-56 (noting several measures Airbnb has taken to exert control over hosts, including
remittance of taxes, and finding that these controls “bring[ ] Airbnb’s practices closer to those
of Uber”). 
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successful, the independent contractor argument would severely
restrict guests’ redress for injuries at Airbnb listings.
The company is further insulated from liability through contract.
Specifically, Airbnb provides its own, one-million-dollar insurance
only after hosts exhaust all their personal coverage.156 The com-
pany’s terms and conditions, which all users agree to, also clarify
Airbnb’s position as a third-party platform.157 The terms explicitly
state: “Airbnb is not a party to any agreements entered into between
hosts and guests, nor is Airbnb a real estate broker, agent or in-
surer.”158 These provisions provide legal grounds for Airbnb to
separate itself from contractual and tort claims that might arise
between hosts and guests, and leave hosts with little backup except
as far as Airbnb is willing to avoid a public relations faux pas.159 The
result for guests is a legal in-between, where neither hosts nor the
corporate “matchmaker” can be held responsible for many injuries
at Airbnb locations.160 These difficulties highlight the tremendous
disparity between the treatment of Airbnb hosts as landlords in the
courts and the reality of the situation on the ground. A disparity
that extends to the very legal philosophy underpinning landlord-
tenant law.
C. A Mismatch of Legal Philosophies
Traditional landlord-tenant law developed on the idea that the
relationships between landlords and their tenants were becoming
“increasingly polarized or exploitive,” and that the law was a means
“to regulate relationships in a competitive economy, not a collabora-
156. Palombo, supra note 51, at 300. 
157. Terms of Service, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/terms [https://perma.cc/X763-
WAEV].
158. Id.
159. In the case of Cory Tschogl, for example, Airbnb agreed to help pay some of the costs
of evicting the squatter in her condominium because it failed to adequately respond to her
initial request for help. See Matyszczyk, supra note 2.
160. Of course, many hosts would be judgement-proof and unable to pay damages if found
liable, but presumably innkeeper-hosts would pressure Airbnb to cover costs, and Airbnb, in
turn, could incentivize hosts to mitigate liability (perhaps through a fee system). See infra
Part IV.D. 
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tive one.”161 But the sharing economy, including Airbnb, is about
primarily horizontal, not vertical, power relationships.162 An Airbnb
host typically is not a sophisticated businessperson with exploitive
interests.163 Rather, hosts are looking to share extra space with
short-term guests who are equally uninterested in bargaining for
property rights.164 Yet, the law does not recognize the difference.165
Landlord-tenant law is built on the idea of capitalist competition
and exploitation and, as such, fails to adapt to the rejuvenation of
collaborative parity—once a hallmark of agrarian societies—in the
sharing economy.166 Thus, the legal theory under which landlord-
tenant law has developed is inappropriate for room-sharing relation-
ships. The answer, addressed in Part IV, is to regulate hosts as
what they are: amateur innkeepers operating micro-businesses that
service guests with limited rental interests, even for stays over
thirty days.
IV. REGULATING HOSTS AS INNKEEPERS
Given the shortfalls of the landlord-tenant approach, innkeeper
liability and a hospitality perspective better encompass the rela-
tionship Airbnb creates. First, innkeeper liability more directly rem-
edies the asymmetry at play in an Airbnb transaction, based not on
power but knowledge.167 The innkeeper treatment of hosts is also
consistent with Airbnb’s treatment in other areas of the law
(namely, taxation).168 And treating hosts as innkeepers will allow for
at-will eviction of unruly guests—a key issue this Note seeks to
remedy.169 Finally, the hospitality perspective provides a framework
for local regulators to bring Airbnb listings into compliance with
161. See Jenny Kassan & Janelle Orsi, The LEGAL Landscape of the Sharing Economy, 27
J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 13 (2012).
162. See id. at 14.
163. Cf. supra note 54 and accompanying text.
164. See AIRBNB, supra note 116 (noting the average length of stay in New York and San
Francisco is less than a week).
165. See supra Part II.A.
166. See Kassan & Orsi, supra note 161, at 14.
167. See infra Part IV.A.
168. See infra Part IV.B.
169. See infra Part IV.C.
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consumer-focused safety standards;170 a framework that landlord-
tenant law fails to adequately provide.
A. The Innkeeper Framework Better Reflects the Asymmetries of
the Airbnb Host-Guest Relationship
As with innkeeper-guest relationships, the Airbnb host-guest
relationship is not so much a power asymmetry as an informational
one. Although landlords have a basic understanding of the property
they lease, they do not know the day-to-day, moment-by-moment
circumstantial risks that arise, because the landlord, in many
instances, is not frequently present.171 Airbnb hosts, on the other
hand, frequently either live on the property being rented or, by the
nature of the amenities the host is providing, must frequently visit
the property in person or through an agent.172 The personal rela-
tionship a host has with a listed property establishes a familiarity
with the property’s inherent risks, giving hosts more reasonable
control of those risks. The Airbnb host, therefore, likely has more
awareness—or should have more awareness—of the risks on his or
her property than a landlord who manages a leasehold at arm’s
length.
More importantly, Airbnb guests, relative to tenants, have less
awareness of the property where they are staying. Tenants, by vir-
tue of the legal interest in the property they seek, have incentives
to inspect the property and research its habitability, risks, and
deficiencies. Tenants also develop an intimate familiarity with the
property they rent, and have at least limited flexibility to customize
the property to suit their living needs. Airbnb guests, on the other
hand, lack the same incentives and are practically limited in their
170. See infra Part IV.D.
171. In fact, many jurisdictions hold landlords liable for accessing a tenant’s property
without consent or a good faith reason (for example, seeking payment of overdue rent). See
49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord & Tenant § 385 (2017).
172. See Palombo, supra note 51, at 303 (“[E]ighty-seven percent of hosts rent the property
where they permanently reside and are not transforming residential buildings into illegal
hotels.”). Airbnb has also removed around 2,000 listings suspected of abusing the platform.
Id. But see Barber, supra note 23 (“According to Inside Airbnb, the majority of Airbnb listings
are not shared rooms rented out while the host is present. Rather, 58.6 percent of Los Angeles
listings, 72.3 percent of New Orleans listings, and 66.6 percent of Seattle listings are for
entire homes.”). 
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ability to physically inspect a location before reserving it.173 While
staying on the property, an Airbnb guest, even for greater than
thirty days, has little need or right to customize the property to suit
his needs and therefore must take the Airbnb rental as is. Thus,
Airbnb hosts and guests have a larger informational asymmetry
than a landlord and tenant: the hosts are more familiar with the
property they rent than a landlord, while guests are more unaware
of the properties they are staying at than the average tenant. This
asymmetry is better reflected through the innkeeper framework.
 Treatment of hosts as innkeepers—at least as far as their duty
to guests—better protects consumers in the sharing economy, who
often stay on premises more unfamiliar and risk-inherent than most
modern-day hotels. The current law simply mismatches the illness
(the asymmetry at play) with the treatment, failing to remedy what
is actually occurring in the sharing economy. Beyond a theoretical
match, innkeeper doctrine is consistent with the treatment of
Airbnb in other areas of law, providing practical, as well as theor-
etical, consistency.
B. Innkeeper Treatment Is Consistent with the Tax Treatment of
Airbnb
Treating Airbnb hosts as innkeepers is congruent with the pre-
vailing trend in many localities to tax Airbnb transactions under a
hospitality/occupancy framework. Airbnb is already taxed like a
hotel in at least six major cities.174 Elsewhere, Airbnb has sought
taxation as a means to legitimize its business, promising at least
173. They must rely instead on Airbnb’s review system, discussed supra Part III.A, which
suffers several deficiencies. See also Zervas et al., supra note 141, at 1, 3 (finding that 95
percent of Airbnb listings have an average user-generated rating of 4.5 or 5 stars and noting
that “existing review platforms have been shown to generate implausible distributions of star-
ratings that are unlikely to reflect true product quality”).
174. Interian, supra note 12, at 135 (“[T]he company already has begun collecting tourist
taxes from guests on behalf of Airbnb hosts in Portland, San Francisco, San Jose, Chicago,
Washington, D.C., and Amsterdam.”). Specifically, Airbnb claims to have paid $5 million in
taxes to San Francisco and Portland in 2014. See Amina Elahi, Airbnb to Begin Collecting




$65 million in revenue per year for New York City, alone.175 In San
Francisco, Airbnb collects a 14 percent tax on hosts’ profits.176 And,
in Los Angeles, Airbnb agreed to pay the city at least $5 million in
back taxes on unregulated rentals.177 In total, Airbnb claims to have
paid $110 million in lodging taxes since 2014.178 Localities willingly
accept the tax revenue as if it were any other hotel tax—to the
mutual benefit of Airbnb, hosts, and local governments.179
To collect from room-sharing services as if they were hotels on one
hand, but treat hosts as landlords on the other, is a dysfunctional
practice. Instead, hosts should be viewed as micro-entrepreneurs,
running micro-hotels that are taxed for the occupancy income they
produce. Treatment of hosts as innkeepers, therefore, is consistent
with taxation of the room-sharing economy and creates uniformity
in the regulation of this new marketplace. Ultimately, if hosts are
taxed like hoteliers, they should possess the rights and responsibil-
ities of hoteliers, including the right to evict guests at will.
C. Innkeeper-Hosts Could Evict Unruly Guests at Will
Treating Airbnb hosts as micro-innkeepers would remove the
problem highlighted in the introduction: the inability of hosts to
evict unruly visitors without difficulty.180 Under the law of many
states, landlords must go through judicial processes to evict guests
who squat on their property or otherwise violate a lease agree-
175. See Ryan Lawler, As It Seeks New Regulations in NY, Airbnb Estimates It Would
Collect $65 Million in Taxes There, TECH CRUNCH (Jan. 16, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/
2015/01/16/airbnb-65-million-in-ny/ [https://perma.cc/2EL9-WPB3] (arguing that the amount
of tax revenue would only increase). Interestingly, the New York hotel industry originally
requested taxation of Airbnb, but when Airbnb tried to accept it, hoteliers opposed the move.
See Palombo, supra note 51, at 304. 
176. Palombo, supra note 51, at 312.
177. Barber, supra note 23. 
178. Id.
179. See Palombo, supra note 51, at 313.
180. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text. For examples of the damage guests can
cause, see, for example, John Annese, Airbnb Guest Steals $5G in Valuables from Manhattan
Apartment, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 9, 2016, 4:02 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/
nyc-crime/airbnb-guest-steals-5g-valuables-manhattan-apartment-article-1.2743622 [https://
perma.cc/BKS7-E8UD] (“Two more Airbnb guests stole tens of thousands in valuables from
two homes in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, in July, taking TVs, electronics and designer handbags,
police said.”).
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ment.181 These summary proceedings can be particularly burden-
some and expensive.182 Innkeepers, on the other hand, have a
general right to evict guests without resorting to court proceedings
so long as there is a valid reason and excessive force is not used.183
For several reasons discussed in this Note, the eviction protec-
tions afforded to Airbnb guests are unnecessary. First, most guests
do not seek a legal interest in the property where they stay, and, if
they do, Airbnb does not create that relationship.184 Second, guests
—even those who stay over thirty days—are unlikely to settle at an
Airbnb location, and those who do settle create a relationship
outside of the Airbnb rental period, which rightfully would remove
hosts from the role of innkeeper. Third, the sharing economy
benefits from hosts’ freedom to evict unruly guests. After all, it is
the host’s furniture and personal belongings the guests use and
potentially threaten. Finally, hosts will be hesitant to evict guests
without cause for fear of a bad review that will harm business, so
hosts are unlikely to abuse the system.185 If hosts do abuse the evic-
tion right, it likely will not be long before Airbnb removes them from
the platform.186 In fact, the longstanding law of most jurisdictions
proscribes innkeepers from “interfer[ing] with the peace and quiet
181. Airbnb hosts (as landlords) who resort to self-help instead of judicial summary eviction
may be held liable to their guests (as tenants). See 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord & Tenant § 837
(2017).
182. See, e.g., Matyszczyk, supra note 2 (“In order to get him out of her condo, [an Airbnb
host] has to go through a full eviction process, which might take three to six months and cost
... up to $5,000.”).
183. See 43A C.J.S. Inns, Hotels, and Eating Places § 24 (2017).
184. See supra Part III.A.
185. For example, hosts have incentives to be certified as a “Superhost” by meeting certain
criteria, and will therefore likely avoid confrontational relationships with guests. See How Do
I Become a Superhost?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/829/how-do-i-become-a-
superhost [https://perma.cc/DA9Q-TDNQ] (noting, among other things, that Superhosts must
receive a 5-star rating on at least 80 percent of their reviews); see also supra notes 137-38 and
accompanying text.
186. Cf. Caroline O’Donovan, Airbnb Removes Host Who Denied a Trans Woman a Place
to Stay, BUZZFEED (June 6, 2016, 1:35 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/carolineodonovan/host-
who-denied-a-trans-woman-a-place-to-stay-removed-from-a?utm_term=.jgQJxXWW6#.oaaz4
DAAo [https://perma.cc/VUP2-J3DW] (noting that Airbnb removed a host for refusing to serve
a transgender woman).
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enjoyment of the guests,”187 and requires hosts to have a valid reas-
on to evict.188
It is worth noting that even hotels may, in specific situations,
establish tenancies with guests.189 However, although some guests
at a hotel may obtain tenant rights in unique circumstances, it is
unlikely those circumstances will arise in the Airbnb context.190
Even so, pragmatic considerations warrant greater leniency in
allowing Airbnb hosts to evict guests in most circumstances.191
Ultimately, although treating hosts as innkeepers imputes great-
er liability for the hosts’ negligence, such treatment has the added
benefit of allowing at-will contracting. This permits hosts to end
risky or unsatisfactory guest relationships without resorting to
months-long judicial procedures. By providing guest protections
where necessary and removing them where they are not needed, the
innkeeper framework better accounts for the interests of guests and
hosts alike.
D. Regulating Airbnb Safety from the Hotel Perspective
The above reasons notwithstanding, regulating hosts as inn-
keepers is not completely ideal. Some hoteliers, for example, have
lobbied for overregulation of Airbnb hosts as a means to stifle what
187. L.W.B., Annotation, Liability of Innkeeper for Interference with Guest, 17 A.L.R. 139
(1922). 
188. See supra note 183 and accompanying text; supra Part II.B. 
189. Specifically, some courts have considered hotel guests tenants if they were non-
transient, furnished or repaired their living space, paid monthly, did not use a maid service,
and maintained the right to exclusive possession. See, e.g., Hundley v. Milner Hotel Mgmt.
Co., 114 F. Supp. 206, 208 (W.D. Ky. 1953); Bourque v. Morris, 460 A.2d 1251, 1253 (Conn.
1983) (stressing the transience requirement to obtain tenant rights); Ortner v. Linch, 128 So.
2d 152, 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (requiring exclusive right of possession to become a
tenant); Neely v. Lott Hotels Co., 78 N.E.2d 659, 659 (Ill. App. Ct. 1948) (holding use of maid
and linen services precluded creation of tenancy). 
190. See supra Part III.A. 
191. Because Airbnb inhibits the creation of tenancies and hosts lack the sophistication of
hoteliers or landlords, it is incumbent upon regulators to allow more lenient eviction laws for
hosts. And, unlike hoteliers, who do not share living space with guests, many Airbnb hosts
are offering portions of their own homes. Prohibiting at-will eviction, therefore, threatens to
disturb the privacy and property rights of hosts. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying
text.
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they perceive as a threat to their profits.192 Hotels have encouraged
enforcement of health and safety laws that would require Airbnb
hosts to provide clean towels, sprinklers, and emergency exits,
making operating an Airbnb cost inhibitive or simply impractical for
many hosts.193 Instead, states and localities should avoid overregu-
lating hosts in the interest of the revenue and community benefits
that room-sharing markets can bring, while tailoring policies to
Airbnb that promote consumer safety and mirror the established
hotel industry.
There are genuine concerns about the safety of Airbnb guests, and
accidents—sometimes fatal—do occur on Airbnb properties.194
However, imputing innkeeper liability to hosts already creates
incentives for them to provide safe, habitable accommodations. The
current alternative, landlord-tenant law, obligates hosts to make
inherent dangers known to guests in relatively limited circum-
stances.195 Hosts, as landlords, are liable only for violations of the
warranty of habitability, which has relatively high thresholds before
landlords must act;196 innkeeper-hosts, on the other hand, would
have a duty to inform their guests of risks and provide safety pro-
tections to cure the inherent dangers at an Airbnb listing.197
Indeed, the threat of personal liability is often used to enforce
regulations, and is an effective way to help protect the safety of
Airbnb guests. By allowing guests to sue hosts for negligence, reg-
ulators create incentives (1) for hosts to provide safe accommoda-
192. See Biz Carson, If the Hotel Industry Has Its Way, Here’s How Hard It Would Be to
Rent Out Your House, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 2, 2016, 7:30 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
ahla-proposes-model-legislation-on-short-term-rentals-like-airbnb-2016-11 [https://perma.cc/
T2QP-NSUH] (discussing model legislation hotel trade groups are pushing, including require-
ments for health and safety inspections). For a discussion on why Airbnb is not necessarily
the threat hoteliers characterize it as, see supra Part I.A.1.
193. See Bitran, supra note 14, at 510-11; Major, supra note 38, at 481-82 (“While hotels
are generally financially secure enough to spread losses, a private person renting out an
apartment will likely be unable to afford any damages.”). 
194. For examples of accidents occurring at Airbnb locations, see Palombo, supra note 51,
at 298 (“On one occasion, a hot water heater could have led to severe injuries had a guest
bumped into it.”); and Christina Bonnington, The Tragic Airbnb Problem You’ve Probably
Never Thought About, REFINERY29 (Nov. 9, 2015, 5:20 PM), http://www.refinery29.com/97263
[https://perma.cc/JD9H-AG4S] (“The [Airbnb] property had a rope swing attached to a tree.
[The guest’s] father got on the swing, and was then killed.”).
195. See Palombo, supra note 51, at 306; supra Part II.A.
196. See supra Part II.A.
197. See supra Part II.B.
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tions, and (2) for Airbnb to offer more effective and encompassing
insurance coverage to hosts, who would likely feel pressured to leave
the company if it did not step up to help them.198 Imputing liability
to hosts will encourage, if not coerce, Airbnb to bear at least some
of the financial costs for violations of the law, much like a hotel
chain—something a company as large and unbridled as Airbnb
should do.
Beyond imposing innkeeper liability, localities also have flexibil-
ity to require or incentivize Airbnb hosts to provide some of the
common-sense safety features found in hotels. Airbnb has already
encouraged hosts to place carbon monoxide and smoke detectors in
every listing.199 Portland, Oregon, has gone as far as requiring all
listings to pass inspection, which includes checking that each unit
has certain detectors.200
As governments consider what to compel Airbnb listings to
provide, they must contemplate the practical difficulties that come
with enforcing regulations on discrete and dispersed micro-busi-
nesses. Most localities likely do not have the time or infrastructure
to enforce a hands-on regulatory scheme. An obvious alternative will
be self-enforcement provisions, which would allow guests to sue
hosts who violate local safety regulations. By requiring applicable
regulations to be posted at each listing and informing guests of their
rights, localities can effectuate a self-enforced system. Coupled with
random inspections and licensing requirements, self-enforcement
provisions are a low-cost means to achieve uniform regulation of
Airbnb listings. And localities should not forget that Airbnb, as a
company, can and should be a willing partner in helping to enforce
safer accommodations for transient occupants.201 In fact, the company’s
198. See Major, supra note 38, at 482 (noting that Airbnb’s claim that it is merely a
“facilitator” would place financial liability solely on hosts, thereby creating pressure on Airbnb
to voluntarily assume liability or risk losing inventory). 
199. Brian Chesky, Shared City, MEDIUM (Mar. 26, 2014), https://medium.com/@bchesky/
shared-city-db9746750a3a#.qj46weakr [https://perma.cc/64CU-KBZL].
200. Miller, supra note 37, at 191 (citing PORTLAND, OR., ZONING CODE §§ 33.207.040, .050
(2015)). 
201. For a discussion on how Airbnb can provide more support for enforcing laws and
regulations on hosts, see Palombo, supra note 51, at 320 (arguing, for example, that “[t]he
legal information on Airbnb’s website needs to be comprehensive for users because hosts are
still responsible for Airbnb-related infractions”). San Francisco already requires Airbnb to
inform hosts of laws applicable to their operations, or face a penalty. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE
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online tracking of user behavior provides better information for reg-
ulators to use than more traditional hospitality businesses.202
In the end, unlike hotels equipped for hundreds of guests, the
vast majority of Airbnb hosts are renting one room or location to no
more than a family-sized group of visitors. To require a residential
location that presumably meets state and local standards of hab-
itability to provide advanced, hotel-like safety features for small
numbers of guests amounts to a stifling abuse of the law that
threatens to hinder competition.203 Compelling Airbnb hosts to meet
all the standards of a hotel in hopes it will discourage short-term
rentals rejects what is already a reality: the sharing economy is too
cheap and convenient for consumers to abandon, even if that
economy is forced to operate outside the law.204 Nonetheless, the
hospitality perspective is a good starting point from which localities
can achieve uniformly safer accommodations in the short-term rent-
al market.
§ 41A.5(g)(4)(A),(C) (2017).
202. See Edelman & Geradin, supra note 37, at 325-26 (noting that platforms like Airbnb
“create a virtual roadmap of users’ activities ... [that are] both granular and well-organized,”
with the ability to better control users’ behavior); Major, supra note 38, at 501 (“Munici-
palities can require room-sharing platforms ... to release lists of all available rooms within the
city limits, either to verify self-reporting or to avoid relying on hosts to self-report.”).
203. For a complete argument of why traditional business regulation is not suited for
micro-businesses and the sharing economy, see Miller, supra note 37, at 167-68 (discussing
the impracticalities of total bans, de minimis exceptions, and command-and-control regula-
tions, and noting a “city[’s] response will likely require alternative approaches that rely on
markets, information, and perhaps even regulatory structures that model the sharing
economy more directly”).
204. See Miller, supra note 37, at 168 (“Attempts to crack down on a particular site would
likely simply lead to other sites emerging to perform the same service.”); Barber, supra note
23 (“[A]lmost all urban areas, at some point, have had laws or zoning provisions prohibiting
short-term rentals of less than 30 days without a special permit. And yet, that hasn’t stopped
the incredible boom in the number of listings on Airbnb.”). Airbnb’s popularity also has the
potential to wield considerable political clout at higher levels of government. Cf. Miller, supra
note 37, at 156-57 (describing how Uber lobbied Idaho’s conservative state legislature when
Boise banned the company, usurping the local government’s authority to regulate transpor-
tation networks). Airbnb is not just a millennial trend, either. Co-founder Brian Chesky told
a reporter, “We’ve got more people aged 55 and over on the site than those aged 18-25, who
only make up seven per cent of the site.” Salter, supra note 13.
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CONCLUSION
As state, local, and national governments grapple with the chal-
lenge of regulating sharing economy platforms, a varied patchwork
of liberal and restrictive policies has emerged. In the case of Airbnb,
some locales have embraced the company as a stimulus to the
economy, while others, such as New York, have condemned the
service. Airbnb’s rapid rise and potential for commercial abuse do
create genuine concerns for communities nationwide, and it is
undeniable that some regulation, which Airbnb should welcome as
a means to legitimacy, is necessary to mitigate this impact. But
Airbnb’s potential to reach new tourists, create competition with
hospitality cartels, and generate considerable tax revenue should
serve as word to the wise as policymakers consider on which end of
the regulatory spectrum their locality will fall.
Regardless of the other factors regulators consider, it will be
necessary for courts, legislatures, and city councils to revisit how
room-sharing hosts fit within the traditional doctrinal framework.
As this Note points out, landlord-tenant law simply fails to under-
stand the relationship created in the prosumerist economy.205
Landlord-tenant law assumes a relationship of economic exploita-
tion and the creation of a legal interest in property, but room-
sharing—even when the host is absent—is grounded on the concept
of just that: sharing. Airbnb guests do not seek to protect their legal
property interests against sophisticated landlords; instead, Airbnb
users are unfamiliar, disinterested renters looking for a place to
stay in a foreign destination.206 The informational asymmetry
between Airbnb hosts and their guests is best remedied not by
landlord-tenant law, which imputes little responsibility to hosts to
serve guests’ interests, but by traditional innkeeper liability, which
creates a responsibility for hosts to mitigate risks and warn guests
of potential dangers.207 Other regulations of Airbnb have already
assumed the company’s place in the hotel industry, and innkeeper
liability for hosts would be consistent with this trend.
205. See supra Part III.
206. See supra Part III.C.
207. See supra Part IV.
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Innkeeper liability for all Airbnb transactions—even those over
thirty days—also helps to avoid abuse by landlords seeking to make
a quick buck at the expense of long-term tenants. If landlords want
to abuse the Airbnb platform, they should have to assume greater
liability for the guests staying on their property. Ultimately, inn-
keeper liability would be one tool to help mitigate some of the
primary negative externalities of short-term rentals (for example,
speculation and housing shortages).
Moving forward, Airbnb is approaching a new era of regulation
that likely will reduce its value and slow its tremendous growth.
Airbnb may fight some of this regulation, but consistent, predictable
laws will be better for the company—and the sharing economy—in
the long run. Airbnb is here to stay, and it is time for the law to
catchup. It is time to recognize Airbnb’s place in traditional legal
doctrines, and to adjust doctrine where it does not address the
sharing economy’s unique characteristics. Treating hosts as micro-
hoteliers is just one way the law can promote a safer, consumer-
focused room-sharing economy while encouraging its potential.
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